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The prevalence of cash flow manipulation has drawn much scholarly attention in China and 
worldwide, especially since the exposure of the accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and 
Qwest. Cash flow status also provides a sound basis for corporate valuation. Using a sample of 
12,251 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2009, this study thus investigates the attitudes and 
behavioral patterns of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs in China toward cash flow 
manipulation. From a point of departure of resource-dependence theory, we find that non-SOEs 
tend to manipulate cash flow upward, whereas SOEs are more prone to manipulate cash flow 
downward. We also demonstrate that non-SOEs are more inclined to manipulate their cash flow 
statements compared with SOEs. The reason behind this differing behavior could be that non-
SOEs are reliant on cash and funds from entities, such as governments and banks, and thus, they 
falsely enhance cash flow and firm performance in order to signal their solvency and thereby 
reduce financing costs. By contrast, since SOEs always receive sufficient cash inflows from both 
government sources and state-owned banks, the managers of these firms are unconcerned about 
cash flow shortages, which lessens their motivation to manipulate the figures. Indeed, this study 
finds that these managers may even reduce reported cash flow intentionally in order to obtain 
government assistance. Therefore, investors and regulators should make their judgments on the 
cash flow of entities based on their status as SOEs or non-SOEs. 
 






ash flow is recognized as the lifeblood of a firm. All companies rely on sufficient cash flow to invest in 
new projects, repay debt, pay dividends to shareholders, and provide a safety net for emergencies 
(Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003). Cash flow status thus provides a sound basis for corporate 
valuation. The importance of operating cash flow has been repeatedly emphasized over recent decades, especially its 
role in appraising CEO performance and agreeing compensation packages (Aboody & Kasznik, 2000; Nwaeze, 
Yang, & Yin, 2006). Operating cash flow can also improve the accuracy of investor forecasting (Hewitt, 2009; 
Waldron & Jordan, 2010). In particular, demand for detailed current year and forecasted cash flow information has 
increased since the exposure of the accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and Qwest revealed that these 
organizations were engaged in obvious cash flow manipulations (Edmonds, Edmonds, & Maher, 2011). 
 
Cash flow manipulation is defined as the managerial tendency to use internal resources to change reported 
cash flow in order to achieve predetermined goals (Zhang, Dong, & Guo, 2007). For example, managers could 
increase cash inflow at year end by collecting greater amounts of accounts receivable (e.g., by offering aggressive 
discounts to clients) or by delaying payments to suppliers. However, managers cannot use financing activities to 
manipulate a firm’s cash flow because these are mainly constrained by creditors. On the contrary, financing 
activities are always the result of cash flow manipulation. Cash flow manipulation has recently been documented in 
C 
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Western developed security markets (Frankel, 2005) while the prevalence of cash flow manipulation has also drawn 
much scholarly attention in China (Wang, 2004a, 2004b; Fang, 2005; Chen, 2006; Zhang, 2007; Guo, Zhang, & 
Dong, 2007; Zhang, Guo, & Wang, 2008; Zhang, Guo, & Xu, 2010; Guo, Zhang, & Li, 2011). 
 
Because more than 70% of Chinese-listed companies are state-owned, the present paper contributes to the 
extant cash flow manipulation literature by shedding light on the differences between state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs)
1
 and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs); namely, companies controlled by families, institutional 
investors, and other non-SOEs. Further, because SOEs have strong political backgrounds and expect financial 
support from the government, they have many varied resources, which are more adequate (including cash flow), 
compared with non-SOEs. Further, compared with SOEs, non-SOEs have more difficulty accessing credit from 
banks and government grants. Therefore, there are significant differences in the supply and demand of cash flow 
between SOEs and non-SOEs. This raises the following important questions:  1) What are the different motivations 
behind cash flow manipulation in SOEs and in non-SOEs and 2) Do SOEs and non-SOEs manipulate reported cash 
flows to a similar degree? 
 
This paper answers these two research questions by comparing the cash flow manipulation behavior of 
SOEs and non-SOEs listed on the Chinese stock market. From the empirical results, we find that the degree of cash 
flow manipulation is more serious in non-SOEs than it is in SOEs. An interesting observation is that non-SOEs are 
more prone to increase reported cash flows, while SOEs tend to decrease reported cash flows. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Cash Flow Manipulation 
 
Cash flow data provide important information for the assessment of a company’s value. Although earnings 
are considered to be an important measure of firm performance, they can prove to be less reliable (Dechow, 1994). 
Earnings are produced under accrual accounting, but the method of accruals introduces its own problems, as it gives 
managers opportunities to use their discretion to manipulate the figures. Cash flow statements, on the contrary, are 
more difficult to manipulate. Thus, cash flow information is viewed as more solid evidence and less susceptible to 
artificial manipulation compared with actual reported accounting earnings (Edmonds et al., 2011). 
 
Operating cash flow is playing an increasingly significant role in improving the accuracy of investors’ firm 
forecasts (Hewitt, 2009). Sufficient cash flow also provides evidence of a company’s capability to repay its loans 
(Dichev & Skinner, 2002). Hence, cash flow is the most efficient method for reflecting solvency. As a result, more 
and more companies are intentionally increasing their degree of reporting on cash flow. However, increasing 
demand for detailed cash flow information and cash flow forecasts has resulted in accounting scandals involving 
cash flow manipulation (Edmonds et al., 2011). 
 
In addition to the global accounting scandals involving Enron and WorldCom, a number of studies have 
also shown the existence of cash flow manipulation practices in China’s emerging stock market. Fang (2005) and 
Wang (2004a) first proposed the existence of cash flow manipulation in Chinese listed companies. Chen (2006) and 
Zhang et al. (2008) then found that Chinese listed companies manipulate their cash flow statements, especially 
during periods of refinancing. Evidence of cash flow manipulation was also found in management buy-outs (Guo et 
al., 2007). Zhang (2007) further extended the research on this topic by using the concept of earnings thresholds to 
compare cash flow manipulation in China’s emerging market with the mature market in the US. The author proved 
that managers manipulate cash flow in order to beat three thresholds: current cash flow, the previous year’s cash 
flow, and analysts’ cash flow forecasts. Zhang et al. (2010) and Guo et al. (2011) also found a hierarchy of these 
three thresholds of cash flow manipulation in China. 
  
                                                 
1 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are companies that are under the control of state. There are four main types of ownership in 
Chinese-listed companies - State ownership, legal-person ownership held by State-owned firms or institutions, private ownership, 
and foreign ownership. 
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Background of SOEs and Non-SOEs 
 
Previous studies that have focused on mature markets such as the US or the UK have examined whether (i) 
accruals add information to operating cash flow in order to improve earnings ability and thus explain profit returns 
and (ii) discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals are priced differently (Haw, Qi, & Wu, 2001). However, the role 
of operating cash flow has yet to be studied in the emerging capital market of China. Although the Ministry of 
Finance in China has issued new accounting standards, these standards and practices in China are still evolving. 
Moreover, the financial reporting and capital market systems are still considered to be relatively primitive and the 
quality of auditing is low compared with the mature markets in the west, whose accounting systems are more 
sophisticated and investors relatively well informed (Abdel-Khalik, Wong, & Wu, 1999; Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 
2000). In addition, some critics argue that accounting information in emerging capital markets such as China may 
not be reliable or even useful to investors, especially since choices of accounting methods and management 
decisions are affected by a company’s status as an SOE or non-SOE. Thus, the closer examination of the supply and 
demand of cash flow information could help us understand the problem of cash flow manipulation in China’s 
emerging capital market. 
 
A salient institutional feature is that state ownership dominates listed companies in China (Sun & Tong, 
2003). Most Chinese listed firms are carve-outs or spin-offs from large SOEs, in which the original firms still own a 
large percentage of the total shares (Liu & Lu, 2007). Consequently, state ownership accounted for approximately 
70% of total businesses in 2006 (Zou and Xiao, 2006). This distinct feature is a result of China’s “gradualist” reform 
strategy as opposed to the “big bang” privatization approach taken by certain eastern European countries (Qian, 
Roland, & Xu, 1999). Since its reforms and open door policy, China has made great economic progress, with SOEs 
and non-SOEs playing an essential role in these economic reforms. With the gradual deepening of enterprise reform, 
corporate performance has become the most important criterion for evaluating firm value and managerial capability. 
As such, cash flow provides crucial information for assessing company value, and managers in SOEs and non-SOEs 
are all paying more attention to cash flow than ever before. 
 
Resource Dependence Theory and Hypotheses Development 
 
Resource dependence theory suggests that no group is self-sufficient and that social relations commonly 
entail mutual dependence between parties. These mutual needs imply that each party is in a position, at least to some 
degree, to be able to grant or deny, facilitate or hinder the other’s gratification. This means that A depends on B if A 
aspires to goals or gratification whose achievement is facilitated by the appropriate actions on B’s part. By virtue of 
mutual dependency, it is more or less imperative to each party that he or she be able to control or influence the 
other’s conduct. Thus, the power to control or influence another person resides in the control over the resources he 
or she values (Emerson, 1962). 
 
Supply and Demand of Cash Flow 
 
Government support is important for corporate development. Market entrants that receive government 
grants and loans via bank-issued shares or bonds can purchase plants, equipment, and raw materials and invest in 
projects. Further, because most SOEs are ultimately controlled by the government and because of their large firm 
size, high technology, and great background, their operating risk is lower and their chances of solvency higher. 
Therefore, they can access government assistance and loans more easily and attract further investment. The outcome 
of this is that SOEs attain adequate finance and are thus not prone to manipulating cash flow. Moreover, for social 
and political reasons (e.g., with regard to maintaining employment and social stability), the Chinese government at 
all levels has been reluctant to bankrupt SOEs (Zou and Xiao, 2006). This provides another reason why the 
government provides a steady flow of financial support to SOEs. Indeed, some SOEs are so important to the local 
economy that even if they make a loss, they can still afford to make huge investments in restructuring because of 
their vast levels of financial assistance from the government. 
 
However, because small-sized non-SOEs face greater uncertainty and higher risk in the marketplace, banks 
are reluctant to lend them money and thus they face difficulties in attracting financial support. Ma and Parish (2006) 
suggest that Chinese private entrepreneurs made generous donations to government welfare projects until the 1990s, 
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gaining in exchange political access and social status via appointments to political councils. Thus, by giving 
considerable charitable contributions, Chinese private entrepreneurs elicited social and political benefits in return. 
 
Because resource dependence theory only focuses on the positive externalities of resource heterogeneity 
(i.e., creating the economic rent), but neglects negative externalities, opportunistic behavior may develop. Since 
corporate access to resources is based on certain factors and the context in which the organization is embedded 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003), these factors control some of the organizational activities they regulate. Further, in 
Chinese listed companies, a mindset of the need to window dress their “shop fronts” to meet bank and other creditor 
requirements can develop during the process of gaining access to cash and other investments. With this outlook, 
some companies are prone to manipulate earnings management and/or cash flow in order to enhance performance. 
 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) use a database of private corporate lending agreements to test the debt covenant 
hypothesis. Debt covenants are optimally set more tightly in private lending agreements than they are in public debt 
agreements (Smith and Warner, 1979), which implies that the covenants in private debt agreements are more likely 
to affect managers’ financial reporting decisions. Moreover, the cost and benefits of avoiding covenant violations 
are likely to be substantially larger for managers of firms that are suffering financial difficulty. Once firm 
performance deteriorates, managers’ abilities to avoid debt covenant constraints are likely to reduce. For example, if 
the company’s economic performance is declining, managers must make greater and more aggressive accrual 
choices, thereby increasing reported earnings (especially when their accounting discretion has already been “used 
up”), while real choices are likely to be constrained by declining cash flow. Hence, managers may also choose to 
manipulate operating cash flow (e.g., EBIT, EBITDA) at the year end. Since debt-to-cash flow ratios are important 
indicators, sufficient cash flow shows repayment capability. 
 
Billings and Morton (2002) also demonstrate the importance of operating cash flow for reducing credit risk. 
If a company’s earnings per share is higher than that of other companies but its cash flow is smaller, then it will still 
draw the attention of analysts and investors. In this event, the company will face problems repaying its loans and 
find further difficulties obtaining new loans, as it is now classified as a credit risk. Further, because cash flow is by 
far the most efficient method for reflecting solvency, managers also need to maintain large amounts of cash flow 
into their companies. 
 
Paradoxically, because SOEs know that they can obtain guaranteed funding from the government, SOE 
managers may purposely manipulate cash flow downward in order to show a deficit or poor profit and thus obtain 
more financial support from the government. By contrast, non-SOEs might deliberately manipulate cash flow 
upward even though their cash flow is poor. Since a cash surplus implies a position of solvency, lenders believe that 
they can repay the money. 
 
The foregoing analysis implies that a healthy cash flow is paramount for obtaining loans, especially for 
non-SOEs because their need for cash and other funding from the government, banks, and other creditors is greater. 
By contrast, SOEs want to decrease cash flow in order to obtain more financial support from the government. In 
summary, from the perspective of resource dependence theory, we propose two directional hypotheses of cash flow 
manipulation: 
 
H1a: Cash flow in non-SOEs is manipulated to appear higher than normal cash flow. 
 




As discussed earlier, most listed firms in China are carve-outs or spin-offs from large SOEs. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) point out that the ownership of SOEs is controlled by corporate bureaucracy and that corporate 
bureaucracies are always appointed by the government. Therefore, the managers in SOEs often hold political 
positions in central and local governments. Under this constraint, they cannot manipulate cash flow to appear too 
low, since very bad cash flow performance would imply poor management capability and/or inefficient investment 
strategies, which would pose a threat to their positions. Displaying a very low cash flow could also make SOEs face 
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financial risk, leading to a difficulty obtaining bank loans. On the contrary, non-SOEs manipulate cash flow upward 
without restrictions as they believe that signals their payment capability to lenders. We speculate that non-SOEs are 
more prone than SOEs to manipulate cash flow in order to enhance their cash flow performance. Based on the above 
discussion, we constructed a comprehensive theoretical framework to explain the determinants and motivation of 
cash flow manipulation for SOE and non-SOEs as shown in Figure 1. We also propose hypothesis H2: 
 
H2: Cash flow manipulation is more prevalent in non-SOEs than it is in SOEs. 
 
 
1. The government and banks actively support sufficient funding to SOEs. 
2. The managers of SOEs manipulate cash flow to appear lower than normal in order to show cash flow 
shortages and thus obtain more government funding. 
3. The government and banks are reluctant to supply funding to non-SOEs. 
4. The managers of non-SOEs manipulate cash flow to appear higher than normal in order to show solvency 
and thus receive more government funding. 
5. The managers of SOE cannot manipulate cash flow too low since poor cash flow performance would pose a 
threat to their political positions and banks may worry about the risk of non-repayment.  
6. The managers of non-SOEs manipulate cash flow upward without restrictions. 




Data and Sample 
 
Since 1999, the cash flow statements of listed companies have been required to be disclosed by the China 
Security Regulatory Commission. Thus, the data on listed companies used for the sample in this study came from 
1999, namely a period when company cash flow was recognized to be more stable and precise. We selected our 
sample as follows. We began with an original sample of 14,441 firm-year observations, which listed only A-share 
stock market-listed firms that did not belong to either financial or insurance industries. We then removed from this 
initial number 487 observations whose gearing ratios were larger than 1 and 1703 observations whose listing 
histories were less than three years. The remaining 12,251 firm-year observations were used as the final research 
sample. All financial data were derived from the CSMAR database. 
 




In order to determine the level of cash flow manipulation, we must calculate the abnormal levels of 
operating cash flow (CFO), since CFO reflects cash inflow and outflow in all companies. According to 
Roychowdhury (2006), we also assume that normal cash flow has a linear relationship with sales; thus, abnormal 
operating cash flow (ACFO) is defined as the deviation between reported cash flow (RCFO) and real CFO. Reported 
cash flow is presented in the cash flow statement, whereas real CFO is only estimated. 
 
 
① Active Supply 
③ Passive Supply 
② Decrease Cash Flow 
④ Increase Cash Flow 
⑤ Constraints 
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The estimated model initially developed by Dechow, Kothari, and Watts (1998) was based on the selling 
process, while Li, Guo, and Zhang (2009) improved the model by considering the effect of fixed costs on the 
estimation of CFO. In line with the model put forward by Li et al. (2009), we calculate real CFO as net operating 
cash flow based on the items in the direct method cash flow statement as follows: 
 
Cash flows from operating activities (CFOit)=Cash received from the sale of goods or rendering of services 
(SCit)－Cash paid for goods and services (PCit)＋Net cash paid and received for taxes (TCit)－Cash paid to 
employees (ECit)＋Other net cash relating to operating activities (OCit)             (1) 
 
Then, the estimated operating cash flow estimation models are as follows: 
 1 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 4 1
5 1 6 1
/ = ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
( / ) ( / )
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it
CFO A S A S A S A TC A
EC A OC A
    
  
     
 






CFOit is operating cash flow in year t; 
Ait-1 is total assets in year t-1; 
Sit is sales in year t; 
∆Sit is sales from year t-1 to t; 
∆Sit-1 is sales from year t-2 to t-1; 
TCit is net cash flow from receiving and paying taxes and expenses;  
ECit is net cash paid to employees; and  
OCit is net cash flow from receiving and paying other cash relating to operating activities. 
 
According to the Jones (1991) model, we divide reported CFO into estimated operating cash flow (ECFO) 
and ACFO as follows: 
 
it it itRCFO ECFO ACFO   (3) 
 
We then acquire ACFO as follows. 
 
it it itACFO RCFO ECFO   (4) 
 
Because the largest shareholder in a listed company always determines ownership, we select the stock 
property of the primary shareholder from CSMAR as the determinant of whether the firm is an SOE, for which we 
use the variable state-controlled enterprise (SCE) in this paper. SCE thus takes the value of 1 if the firm’s largest 
shareholder’s property is state stock and it is a SOE, and 0 otherwise. This includes private enterprises as well as 
foreign-funded enterprises. 
 
We also select the following control variables: shareholding concentration (SHC), company size (SIZE), 
leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), revenue growth ratio (GROW), whether the company has established an 
auditing committee or not, what auditing opinion was given, whether the company is audited by the Big 4/5 
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Table 1:  Variables and Definitions 
Variable Definitions 
AACFO Absolute value of ACFO 
ACFO Abnormal operating cash flow: ACFO = RCFO – ECFO 
ACFO1 Abnormal operating cash flow (positive) 
ACFO2 Abnormal operating cash flow (negative) 
SCE 
State-controlled enterprise: dummy variable coded 1 if the company’s largest shareholder’s property is state stock, 0 
otherwise 
SHC Shares owned by the largest shareholder/total share capital issued 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV Ratio of debt to total assets  
ROA Return on assets: net profits/assets 
GROW Revenue growth ratio: revenue changes from last year to this year/ revenue this year 
AUCOM Dummy variable coded 1 if the company has established an audit committee, 0 otherwise 
OPIN Dummy variable coded 1 if the auditing opinion given by auditors was a standard unqualified opinion, 0 otherwise 
BIG4 Dummy variable coded 1 if audited by the Big 4/5 accounting firms* 
INDU 
11 dummy variables for 12 industries, taking the manufacturing industry as reference 0, 1 if the firm is non-
manufacturing. 
YEAR 10 dummy variables for 11 industries, coded 0 if the firm is in year 1999, coded 1 if the firm is in year 2000…. 




To compare the cash flow manipulation behavior of SOEs and non-SOEs, we construct the following Cash 
Flow and Ownership Model. 
 





it it it it it it it it
it it it it
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables introduced in Table 1. The minimum absolute 
value of abnormal CFO (AACFO) is rounded to 0.0000 while the reported cash flow figures deviate from the 
estimated values by an average of 7.15% with a maximum deviation of 3.0870. Minimum abnormal CFO (ACFO) is 
-1.4299 which means that estimated cash flow is higher than that reported. In other words, managers manipulate 
reported cash flow to appear lower than real cash flow. A total of 73% of sample companies are SOEs, while the 
average value of the shares owned by the largest shareholder is 18.71%. The logarithm of the average size of the 
sample is 21.31. This means that the average total assets of sample companies are 4.264 billion RMB. Average 
leverage (LEV) is 49.20%, which implies that the average gearing ratio remains at a rational level. Average return on 
assets (ROA) is 3.01%, which shows that the profitability of sample companies is relatively low. However, the 
average revenue growth ratio is 21.71%, which suggests rapid revenue growth. Further, fewer than one-third of the 
sample companies have established auditing committee. Finally, OPIN and BIG4 were 90.89% and 6.28%, 
respectively, which shows that most companies have been issued with a standard unqualified audit opinion but that 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Minimum Q1 Mean Media Q3 Maximum Std. Dev. 
AACFO 0.0000 0.0212 0.0715 0.0475 0.0909 3.0870 0.0910 
ACFO -1.4299 -0.0471 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0481 3.0870 0.1157 
SCE 0 0 0.7303 1 1 1 0.4438 
SHC 0.0000 0.0715 0.1871 0.1477 0.2757 0.7847 0.1446 
SIZE 14.9375 20.6039 21.3109 21.1903 21.8972 28.0031 1.0649 
LEV 0 0.3606 0.4920 0.4988 0.6268 1.0493 0.1871 
ROA -0.9986 0.0093 0.0301 0.0317 0.0605 2.3174 0.0798 
GROW -0.7283 -0.0335 0.2171 0.1289 0.3205 3.7745 4.9851 
AUCOM 0 0 0.2023 0 0 1 0.4017 
OPIN 0 1 0.9089 1 1 1 0.2878 
BIG4 0 0 0.0628 0 0 1 0.2426 
 
To compare the growth trend for sample companies, the numbers of SOEs and non-SOEs by sample year 
are displayed in Table 3. This table shows that the number of SOEs and non-SOEs increased at a similar rate, 
although the former was always twice the number of the latter. 
 
Table 3:  Breakdown of SOEs and Non-SOEs 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
SOEs 495 643 650 756 817 863 894 931 929 963 1,006 8947 




Table 4 lists the correlation matrix of the main variables used in the regression model (5). The absolute 
value of abnormal CFO (AACFO) has a significantly negative correlation with SCE but a significantly positive 
correlation with shareholding concentration (SHC), company size, leverage (LEV), firm performance, and growth. 
Further, from the correlation coefficients among these variables, it can be seen that there is no serious 
multicollinearity problem. 
 
Table 4:  Correlation Matrix of AACFO and SCE 
 AACFO SCE SHC SIZE LEV ROA GROW AUCOM OPIN BIG4 
AACFO 1 -0.039** 0.023** 0.037** 0.014 0.177** 0.091** -0.017* 0.053** 0.037** 
SCE -0.033** 1 0.30** 0.165** 0.013 -0.016 0.036** 0.011 0.074** 0.057** 
SHC 0.038** 0.274** 1 0.164** -0.105** 0.140** 0.073** -0.071** 0.066** 0.099** 
SIZE 0.056** 0.169** 0.200** 1 0.215** 0.157** 0.144** 0.098** 0.154** 0.250** 
LEV 0.057** 0.008 -0.107** 0.192** 1 -0.355** 0.053** 0.042** -0.169** -0.041** 
ROA 0.148** 0.011 0.123** 0.155** -0.315** 1 0.341** 0.010 0.282** 0.095** 
GROW 0.053** -0.009 0.012 -0.003 0.019 0.020 1 -0.001 0.171** 0.020 
AUCOM -0.022 0.011 -0.071** 0.092** 0.044** 0.004 -0.006 1 0.063** -0.003 
OPIN 0.035** 0.074** 0.067** 0.161** -0.1889** 0.319** 0.002  1 0.040** 
BIG4 0.019 0.057** 0.099** 0.324** -0.042** 0.068** -0.005  0.040 1 
Notes: 
(1) The upper right-hand triangle is Spearman's rank correlation coefficient and the bottom left-hand triangle is Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient. 
(2) ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
We next carry out a further correlation analysis between positive abnormal cash flow manipulation 
(ACFO1)/negative abnormal cash flow manipulation (ACFO2) and the other main variables to ascertain the degree of 
cash flow manipulation in SOEs and non-SOEs. The correlation results listed in Tables 5 and 6 again show that 
there is no serious multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 5:  Correlation Matrix of ACFO1 and SCE 
 ACFO1 SCE SHC SIZE LEV ROA GROW AUCOM OPIN BIG4 
ACFO1 1 -0.037** 0.047** 0.069** -0.051** 0.320** 0.157** 0.032 0.082** 0.064** 
SCE -0.025* 1 0.324** 0.177** 0.014 -0.023 0.010 0.016 0.066** 0.047** 
SHC 0.050** 0.295** 1 0.186** -0.141** 0.155** 0.058** -0.070** 0.069** 0.119** 
SIZE 0.057** 0.178** 0.230** 1 0.230** 0.107** 0.122** 0.089** 0.115** 0.292** 
LEV 0.021 0.010 -0.134** 0.215** 1 -0.399** 0.106** 0.057** -0.107** -0.050** 
ROA 0.247** -0.004 0.118** 0.075** -0.293** 1 0.291** 0.009 0.214** 0.093** 
GROW 0.048** -0.026 0.005 -0.006 0.008 0.028 1 -0.008 0.124** -0.001 
AUCOM 0.043** 0.016 -0.069** 0.094** 0.056** 0.002 0.022 1 0.044** 0.001 
OPIN 0.042** 0.066** 0.066** 0.126** -0.122** 0.198** 0.006 0.044** 1 0.020 
BIG4 0.028 0.047** 0.123** 0.372** -0.045** 0.058** -0.007 0.001 0.020 1 
Notes: 
(1) The upper right-hand triangle is Spearman's rank correlation coefficient and the bottom left-hand triangle is Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient. 
(2) ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6:  Correlation Matrix of ACFO2 and SCE 
 ACFO2 SCE SHC SIZE LEV ROA GROW AUCOM OPIN BIG4 
ACFO2 1 0.042** 0.002 -0.0045 -0.080** -0.040** -0.024 -0.055** -0.030 -0.002 
SCE 0.041** 1 0.274** 0.150** 0.015 -0.018 0.055** 0.008 0.076** 0.066** 
SHC -0.025* 0.252** 1 0.136** -0.063** 0.113** 0.081** -0.071** 0.058** 0.070** 
SIZE -0.053** 0.154** 0.155** 1 0.222** 0.165** 0.142** 0.099** 0.167** 0.196** 
LEV -0.097** 0.011 -0.072** 0.198** 1 -0.302** 0.024 0.028 -0.206** -0.021 
ROA -0.052** 0.015 0.113** 0.190** -0.314** 1 0.357** 0.009 0.318** 0.078** 
GROW -0.064** -0.004 0.018 -0.001 0.025 0.023 1 0.001 0.192** 0.029 
AUCOM -0.058** 0.008 -0.074** 0.110** 0.026 0.026 -0.008 1 0.082** -0.006 
OPIN -0.030 0.076** 0.061** 0.175** -0.227** 0.387* 0.002 0.082** 1 0.0489** 
BIG4 -0.006 0.066** 0.0623** 0.251** -0.028 0.057** -0.004 -0.006 0.049** 1 
Notes:  
(1) The upper right-hand triangle is Spearman's rank correlation coefficient and the bottom left-hand triangle is Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient. 




We next compare the main variables by T-test. Table 7 shows that positive abnormal CFO (ACFO1) in non-
SOEs is significantly higher than that in SOEs. This finding means that the cash flow reported by non-SOEs is 
higher than normal. However, the absolute value of negative abnormal CFO (ACFO2) in non-SOEs is significantly 
higher than in SOEs, which implies that the cash flow reported by SOEs is lower than normal. Thus, H1a and H1b 
are supported. Further, the absolute value of abnormal CFO (AACFO) in non-SOEs (0.0764) is higher than that in 
SOEs (0.0696) at a 1% significance level. This finding means that the prevalence of cash flow manipulation by non-
SOEs is greater than that by SOEs. Thus, H2 is supported. 
 
Table 7:  T-test Results for SOEs and Non-SOEs 
Variables SCE Number Mean Std. Dev. Mean Diff. t-value 
ACFO1 
0 1556 0.0755 0.0860 
0.0054** 2.0780 
1 4488 0.0710 0.0962 
ACFO2 
0 1748 -0.0762 0.0965 
-0.0080*** -3.0397 
1 4459 -0.0682 0.0845 
AACFO 
0 3304 0.0764 0.0917 
0.0067*** 3.6027 
1 8947 0.0696 0.0906 
SHC 
0 3304 0.1218 0.0588 
0.0893*** -36.1887 
1 8947 0.2111 0.0743 
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SIZE 
0 3304 21.0149 0.9711 
-0.4052*** 19.8896 
1 8947 21.4202 1.0772 
LEV 
0 3304 0.4893 0.0557 
-0.0336 -0.9488 
1 8947 0.4930 0.0541 
ROA  
0 3304 0.0286 0.0871 
-0.0021 -1.2071 
1 8947 0.0307 0.0769 
GROW 
0 3304 1.6171 0.0466 
-0.8682 -1.0049 
1 8947 0.7489 0.0753 
AUCOM 
0 3304 0.1946 0.3959 
-0.0106* -1.9074 
1 8947 0.2052 0.4039 
OPIN 
0 3304 0.8738 0.3321 
-0.0481*** -7.4695 
1 8947 0.9219 0.2684 
BIG4 
0 3304 0.0399 0.0791 
-0.0312*** -7.1674 
1 8947 0.0711 0.0876 




Table 8 presents the regression results of SCE on ACFO1, ACFO2, and AACFO. The coefficient of SCE on 
ACFO1 is significantly negative (coefficient =-0.0065, t=2.2782), indicating that reported cash flow is higher than 
normal when SCE=0. This finding illustrates that compared with SOEs, non-SOEs are prone to manipulate their 
cash flow statements upward. Therefore, H1a is supported. The coefficient of SCE on ACFO2 is significantly 
negative (coefficient=0.0074, t=2.8943), indicating that reported cash flow is lower than normal when SCE=1. 
Therefore, compared with non-SOEs, SOEs are prone to manipulate their cash flow statements downward. Thus, 
H1b is supported. The coefficient of SCE on AACFO is significantly negative (coefficient =-0.0072, t=3.7578), 
indicating that the degree of cash flow manipulation is deeper when SCE=0. This regression result demonstrates that 
non-SOEs are more prone to manipulating cash flow compared with SOEs. Thus, H2 is supported. 
 
Table 8:  Regression Results for Cash Flow Manipulation by SOEs and Non-SOEs 
 ACFO1 ACFO2 AACFO 
Constant 0.0639** -0.0683*** 0.0794*** 
SCE -0.0065** 0.0074*** -0.0072*** 
SHC 0.0316*** -0.0379*** 0.0355*** 
SIZE -0.0018 0.0020 -0.0023** 
LEV 0.0506*** -0.0489*** 0.0510*** 
ROA 0.3180*** -0.0673*** 0.1939*** 
GROW 0.0002*** -0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
OPIN -0.0009 -0.0042 -0.0022 
BIG4 0.0089* 0.0011 0.0062* 
INDU Controlled 
YEAR Controlled 
N 12251 6044 6207 
adj. R2 0.0802 0.0994 0.0848 




This paper explored whether SOEs and non-SOEs in China have different attitudes toward cash flow 
manipulation. Using a sample of 12,251 firm-year observations based on companies listed on the Chinese stock 
market from 1999 to 2009, it was discovered that 1) non-SOEs are prone to manipulate cash flow upward, 2) SOEs 
are prone to manipulate cash flow downward, and 3) the degree of cash flow manipulation is deeper in non-SOEs 
than it is in SOEs. 
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These results imply different attitudes toward cash flow manipulations for SOEs and non-SOEs. Therefore, 
cash flow manipulation should be reduced or settled according to a company’s status as state-owned or otherwise. 
First, relaxing the policy of lending to non-SOEs may provide this group of firms with financial support and thereby 
reduce cash flow manipulating behavior. Second, tightening the policy of lending to SOEs may enhance their risk 
management approaches and thereby prevent them from falsely lowering their cash flow statements in order to 
obtain money from the government. Third, the government should distribute funding in a more balanced way 
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